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Abstract The pre-eminence of logical dynamics, over a static and purely propo-
sitional view of Logic, lies at the core of a new understanding of both formal
epistemology and the logical foundations of quantum mechanics. Both areas appear
at first sight to be based on purely static propositional formalisms, but in our view
their fundamental operators are essentially dynamic in nature. Quantum logic can
be best understood as the logic of physically-constrained informational interactions
(in the form of measurements and entanglement) between subsystems of a global
physical system. Similarly, (multi-agent) epistemic logic is the logic of socially-
constrained informational interactions (in the form of direct observations, learning,
various forms of communication and testimony) between “subsystems” of a social
system. Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) provides us with a unifying setting in
which these informational interactions, coming from seemingly very different areas
of research, can be fully compared and analyzed. The DEL formalism comes with
a powerful set of tools that allows us to make the underlying dynamic/interactive
mechanisms fully transparent.
Keywords Dynamic epistemic logic · Quantum logic · Logical dynamics
1 Introduction
Our contribution to this anniversary issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic is
meant to give a glimpse into the work done in the last years on logics of informational
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interactions, with a particular stress on two research streams: Dynamic Epistemic
Logic(s) and Quantum Dynamic Logic. These lines of research are just some of the
most recent and on-going developments within the wider (and older) trend known as
the “dynamic turn in logic”, trend pursued (mainly, but not exclusively) by the Ams-
terdam school of logic, trend represented (among others) by Johan van Benthem,
Frank Veltman and Martin Stokhof. In this paper, we use the term “informational
interactions” to refer to a range of processes belonging to different fields of study
encompassing dialogues, observations, physical measurements, acts of learning as
well as communication. In fact, the systematic study of informational interactions
ties in with older developments on action-based reasoning in the areas of theoreti-
cal Computer Science, Philosophy as well as Quantum Logic and Computation. In
Computer Science, action-based reasoning has seen the development of systems such
as Hoare logic, Dynamic Logic, Labeled Transition Systems, Petri Nets, Automata
Theory etc. In Formal Epistemology, various models for belief revision and knowl-
edge updates have been introduced to model situations in which the knowledge or
belief states of an agent change in the face of new incoming information. In the Log-
ical Foundations of Quantum Physics, the work on operational quantum logic treats
experimental procedures as the basic building blocks used to describe the behav-
ior of quantum systems. These areas might seem far apart at first sight, as indeed
that is how they have been treated for a long time, but a closer look at the involved
“informational interactions” reveals that they share a common dynamic/interactive
nature.
In the next section we argue that Quantum logic can be viewed as the logic
of physically-constrained informational interactions and similarly how multi-agent
epistemic logic can be viewed as the logic of socially-constrained informational
interactions. Instead of working with purely static propositional formalisms, we
show that the fundamental operators at play, are really dynamic in nature: quan-
tum implication is best understood as a form of dynamic “weakest precondition”
modality (as in Propositional Dynamic Logic [30]), that pre-encodes the result of
possible measurements; quantum negation is a special case of this, pre-encoding the
impossibility of obtaining certain measurement results; while “knowledge” is best
understood as the result and the object of “epistemic activity”, which is a special kind
of belief management (namely one that is truth-directed). Dynamic Epistemic Logic,
originally designed to model and reason about socially-constrained informational
interactions, offers a powerful set of tools that can well be applied to physically-
constrained informational interactions as well. These views allow us to draw connec-
tions between different areas, making explicit their underlying dynamic/interactive
nature.
In Section 2 we introduce the background and main ideas of Dynamic Quantum
Logic. In Section 3 we introduce the key features of Dynamic Epistemic Logic and
explain the link to belief revision theory. In Section 4 we draw connections between
the two different frameworks. We conclude with a few indicators of promising new
developments that we see in this area of research.
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2 Dynamic Quantum Logic
The dynamic perspective on quantum logic connects well with the earlier inves-
tigations on operational quantum logic, i.e. the “manual” approach (or so-called
test spaces) of Foulis and Randal [27, 37] and the work of the “Geneva School”
led by Jauch and Piron [31–34]. This view equips quantum logic with an opera-
tional dimension, linking every physical property or proposition about a physical
system to the experimental procedures that can be performed on those systems.
Inspired by the work of C. Piron, [33, 34], the operational view has lead to new
axiomatic systems that are now studied in the context of Dynamic Quantum Logic
[7–9, 12–14]. In contrast to the traditional work on quantum logic (following [24,
39]), the dynamic logical approach has several advantages. Its main value lies in
the fact that all the qualitative non-classical properties of quantum systems become
explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. The essence
of quantum non-classicallity lies in the non-classical nature of quantum actions, and
not in the failure of the classical laws of static propositional logic. In a long-standing
debate (sparkled by a discussion in [36]) many held the opposite view, which accord-
ing to us is due to a misunderstanding about the logical laws at play in the quantum
world. In our account, quantum mechanics does not require any modification of
the classical laws of propositional logic. The classical laws of propositional logic,
modelling the static propositions, are fully compatible with dynamic quantum logic.
Another virtue of this approach is that it explicitly bridges the gap between tradi-
tional quantum logic and quantum computation, yielding a basic logical tool that
can be further adjusted to formally verify the correctness of quantum protocols and
algorithms.
As a formal framework, Dynamic Quantum Logic treats quantum actions differ-
ently from the propositions that express static properties about a physical system. The
central force of the framework builds on a distinction between two types of quantum
actions: the first are called “tests” of physical properties and correspond to successful
yes-no measurements while the second are called “quantum gates” and correspond
to the logical gates via which we can let a system evolve. These quantum “tests”
are meant to represent successful measurements of some yes/no property (call it ϕ).
As such, the quantum test of ϕ expresses that if property ϕ is tested, the answer is
positive and consequently the state of the (observed) system will collapse to a state
exhibiting property ϕ. In this way we view quantum tests actions as forms of infor-
mation update. In contrast to tests, the quantum gates represent reversible evolutions
of the physical system.
In Section 4, we compare the quantum test to other dynamic-informational oper-
ators in logic and highlight their common features and differences. But before we
get to this comparison, it is crucial to see that quantum tests exhibit a blending of
both ontic and epistemic features. The ontic features of quantum tests tie in with the
appearance of what is known as a “physical observer effect” when we measure quan-
tum systems. Quantum test actions can (and typically also do) change the ontic state
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of the “observed” system. So any epistemic action by an observer, used to extract
(or learn) information from a quantum system, may have ontic side-effects. In [10],
we formulated this point as a slogan: in a quantum universe “there is no information
change without changing the world”. The epistemic features of quantum tests refer
to the increased uncertainty we experience due to measuring incompatible physical
properties (such as for example, position and momentum). After consecutively testing
two incompatible properties (first test ϕ and then ψ), the acquired information about
ϕ gets overwritten by testing for ψ . This feature explains the non-monotonic dynam-
ics of quantum information change. Note also that in the quantum world, the ontic
effects of quantum tests can be non-local. This refers to the fact that quantum tests are
local actions, used to gather local information about one part of a system. Such local
actions can induce “non-local” ontic effects on another, remote part of the system.
The latter feature of quantum information flow is crucial for our understanding and
modeling of the notion of quantum entanglement. Quantum entanglement is tradi-
tionally defined in Quantum Theory in a quantitative manner, via linear combinations
and tensor products. However, in our dynamic approach we capture entanglement in
a different way, by using pure qualitative tools. In [8–10, 12], we added (qualitative)
spatial features to dynamic quantum logic, allowing us to talk about the local prop-
erties of given subsystems of a quantum system. We will illustrate the formal details
of this in the next section.
2.1 Formalism of Dynamic Quantum Logic
Dynamic Quantum Logic adopts the language of Propositional Dynamic Logic
(PDL), consisting of a level of formulas ϕ and programme constructs π , defined by
mutual recursion:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [π ]ϕ
π ::= a | ϕ? | π ∪ π | π;π
The language is build up from atomic sentences p belonging to a given set of
atomic formulae and basic actions a belonging to a given set of actions. We work
with the standard operators for classical negation¬, conjunction∧, tests ϕ?, arbitrary
choice of actions ∪, action composition ; and the dynamic construct [π ]ϕ. While
the language is known from the work on PDL, its semantics is different. In this
formalism a non-classical semantics is given in terms of non-classical relational mod-
els, called Quantum Transition Systems (QTS). In [7], we first illustrate how Hilbert
spaces can be structured as QTS’s. The work in [7] was the start of a new semantic
approach, which was later further developed in a series of papers [8, 9, 12–14]. In
the next paragraph we introduce the setting of Quantum Transition Systems (QTS)
as part of our quantum semantics for the language of PDL.
A QTS consist of a set  of states, a family of labeled transition relations
{P ?→} ⊆  ×  where the labels represent test actions that come from a given set
of testable properties L ⊆ P(), and a family of labeled transition relations
{ U→} ⊆  ×  where the labels U represent quantum gates. These two types of
binary relations correspond to the two types of basic actions: “quantum tests”
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denoted by P ? and “quantum gates” denoted by U . In the Hilbert space formal-
ism, the “states” correspond to rays (or one-dimensional subspaces) of a given
Hilbert space H . A quantum test ϕ? corresponds to a projector onto (the subspace
generated by) property ϕ in H . Quantum gates U , represent reversible evolutions,
corresponding to unitary transformations in H .
The negation-free part of the above language of PDL can be interpreted in the
semantics given by QTS. This can be done by interpreting tests ϕ? as quantum tests
and basic actions a as quantum gates. The program expressions π are interpreted as
quantum programswhich can be compound constructions building on the basic ingre-
dients of quantum tests and quantum gates. The other operators behave as expected,
in particular ∧ is the classical conjunction and the dynamic construct [π ]ϕ is used
to express the weakest precondition: it captures that if program π would be per-
formed on the current state of the system then the output state will satisfy ϕ. The
non-classical features of quantum systems arise in this setting only due to the non-
classical behavior and interpretation of the quantum actions (and their compounds)
π . This logical system obeys the principle of bivalence. Traditional quantum logic (or
“orthomodular logic” ) can then be re-interpreted inside this logic, first by defining
the operation of orthocomplement in terms of the given basic constructs. Note that in
our dynamic approach the orthocomplement ∼ ϕ of a property ϕ can be viewed as
the impossibility of a successful quantum test, hence we can define ∼ ϕ := [ϕ?]⊥.
The quantum join (or quantum disjunction) is then definable via de Morgan dual of
the classical conjunction under orthocomplement, i.e. ϕ unionsq ψ :=∼ (∼ ϕ∧ ∼ ψ). The
“quantum implication” (or so-called Sasaki hook) is elegantly given by the weakest
precondition of a “quantum test”: ϕ
S→ ψ := [ϕ?]ψ .
The interpretation for the operators in the full language of PDL (with classi-
cal negation), demands a slightly different semantic setting. In this case we work
with a generalized QTS [10, 11], i.e. a QTS in which the only change is that tests
{P ?→}P⊆ are labeled by arbitrary properties (sets of states) instead of testable prop-
erties in L. Note that in Hilbert spaces these arbitrary properties (or propositions) do
not necessarily correspond to a closed linear subspace, while the testable properties
do. However the actions of the form
P ?→ in a generalized QTS still represent “quan-
tum tests”, which are now defined as the test of the strongest testable property that
is entailed by P (because indeed P itself might not be testable). In Hilbert spaces
this will correspond to the closed linear subspace that is generated by the set P . The
interpretation of the language constructs of PDL in a generalized QTS is straight-
forward, using the classical set-theoretic complement to give an interpretation to the
classical negation. Note that the full setting of this logic (which includes the classical
negation) was called the logic of quantum actions (LQA) in [10, 11]. It is important
to note that LQA has more expressive power than standard quantum logic due to the
presence of the classical negation ¬ in its language. In [10, 11] we point to the con-
struction of formulas in LQA, expressing quantum properties of a physical system,
that have no counterpart in traditional quantum logic.
In [9, 12], we added (qualitative) spatial features to dynamic quantum logic,
allowing us to express local properties of given subsystems of a quantum system.
Starting from the above (generalized) QTS semantics, we now extend the setting in
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order to express that the actions can be of various types, depending on their location.
As an example we consider a given compound system S, composed of two subsys-
tems called S1 and S2. The (generalized) QTS for system S needs to include, besides
the “global” actions U and test P ? (on the whole system), also i-local quantum gates
Ui and i-local quantum tests Pi? (for i = 1, 2) that can be performed only on one of
the subsystems Si . There are several ways in which this idea can be further imple-
mented, following the ideas in [12] we proceed by equipping our (generalized) QTS
with a binary equivalence relation 	i over (global states) in . Two possible global
states s, s′ ∈  of system S are “indistinguishable” from the point of view of sub-
system Si iff s′ can be obtained from s by performing a unitary action U that affects
only the environment but leaves Si intact. For two global states of our given com-
pound system S, we set s 	1 s′ iff there exists a 2-local unitary action U2 such that
s′ = U2(s). The local state si of Si (when the global state is s), corresponds to the	i-
equivalence class given by si := {s′ : s 	i s′}. We can view an i-local state as a set
of those global states that are informationaly consistent with the ith-subsystem. Tak-
ing the concept of an si-local state as our basic ingredient, one can define a notion of
an i-local property ϕi in s. So s satisfies ϕi iff the state s is separated in two parts, an
i-part and ¬i-part, where the property ϕ is true only in the states that are i-equivalent
to s. An i-local test is then taken to be the test of an i-local property. We briefly note
that there are alternative ways to define the i-equivalence relation s 	i s′. For exam-
ple, instead of working with unitary operators one can express a correlation between
the outcomes of the quantum measurements on subsystems. In that case we have to
assume that for every i-local measurement, the probability of obtaining any given
result is the same in state s as in state s′.
As standard in modal logic, we introduce a Kripke modality Ki as the operator for
the added equivalence relation 	i . For every property ϕ ⊆  and every component
i ∈ N (where N are the labels for subsystems), we define:
Kiϕ := {s : t ∈ ϕ for all t 	i s} = {s : si ⊆ ϕ} .
We read Kiϕ as a “spatial” operator capturing that the information that (the global
system satisfies) ϕ is potentially available at location i.
Entanglement can now be expressed in our logic via the non-local features we
have introduced. We focus on expressing the existence of an “informational correla-
tion” (without communication) between the subsystems to characterize the notion of
entanglement. First note that a global state s is separable (or, more precisely, subsys-
tem S1 is separable in the state s) iff there exists a state s′ such that s 	2 s′ 	1 c
(where c is the special constant for a known separable global state). Otherwise, the
state s is said to be entangled. Using our Ki modality, we can give an“epistemic”
characterization of entanglement as follows:
s is entangled iff it satisfies the sentence K2K1¬c. In other words, two phys-
ical systems are entangled if and only if they potentially carry (non-trivial)
information about each other (prior to any communication).
As such this setting allows for the study multi-partite quantum information flow and
can be used to provide a formal logical analysis of various protocols in quantum
computing [9, 13, 14].
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3 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) was originally designed to deal with complex
multi-agent learning and communication scenarios in which individual or groups of
agents update their knowledge. Typical scenarios include the muddy children puzzle
(see e.g. [26]) in which a group of agents gain knowledge about the real state of affairs
after a series of truthful public announcements. In cases where all such “informa-
tional interactions” between agents are of the form of truthful public announcements,
the tools of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) can be applied. PAL is one of the
logical systems belonging to the DEL framework which was first formalized (via the
use of Reduction Laws) by Plaza [35] and independently by Gerbrandy and Groen-
eveld [29]. Note that the problem of completely axiomatizing PAL in the presence of
a common knowledge operator was first solved by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [5]. In
PAL, we equip a multi-agent Kripke model with additional modal operators to model
actions. These modal operators for actions are labeled both by propositions and the
so-called “public announcement” operator “!”. The action !ϕ, when successful, has
the effect of deleting the non-ϕ worlds in a given model, and represents the event by
which all agents jointly learn that ϕ was true before the public announcement. As a
consequence of such changes in a given model, the very property that was announced,
while true before the announcement may become false afterwards. This happens for
instance in the case when the sentence that is announced to agent a is a Moore sen-
tence of the form p∧¬Kap (stating that p holds but a does not know p). This Moore
sentence while true before the announcement becomes false afterwards (as the second
conjunct is then no longer true). For this reason we stress that a successful learn-
ing act under a truthful pulic announcement can only guarantee that agents learn that
something was true before the announcement but not necessarily afterwards. How-
ever, the state of the observed system, capturing the ontic state of affairs or so-called
“facts”, is not affected by these public announcements. In DEL this is captured by
the idea that atomic formulas, are left invariant under the announcements.1
Not all “informational interactions” are announcements and not all announcements
are public. A logic for “secret (fully private) announcements” was first proposed by
Gerbrandy [28] and a logic for “private, but legal, announcements” (or what has been
called “fair-game announcements”) was developed by H. van Ditmarsch [25]. Fur-
ther, PAL has been extended with general announcement operators for “epistemic
action types” in the work of Baltag and Moss [4]. These action types capture besides
public announcements also various other actions including private secure communi-
cation. Such epistemic action types were first introduced to model various forms of
“knowledge updates”, i.e. situations in which the agents face new information that is
consistent with their prior information state. Later developments go beyond this set-
ting and include ideas from belief revision theory. In the context of beliefs, agents
1DEL can also deal with so-called (ontic) fact-changing operations, see [2, 23]. Note that such fact chang-
ing operations in the epistemic/doxastic setting of DEL require additional features and are not modelled
as an effect of a pure epistemic action (such as a public or private announcement).
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update or revise their prior (belief) state with new information that may actually con-
tradict their prior beliefs. In this context, traditional DEL and the standard AGM
framework on belief revision [1] have been merged into a new study that extends both
approaches [15–18, 20–22].
3.1 Formalism of Dynamic Epistemic Logic
The toolbox of standard DEL, uses Multi-agent Kripke models (see e.g. [6]). Starting
from a given set  of basic (non-epistemic) facts and a finite set A of agents, a -
Kripke model is a triple S = (S, A−−→, ‖.‖ ) consisting of a set S of states (or possible
worlds); a family of binary accessibility relations
a−→ ⊆ S × S, one for each agent
a ∈ A, and a valuation ‖.‖ :  → P(S) assigning to each p ∈  a set ‖p‖S of states.
The valuation is also called a truth map and is meant to express the factual content of
a given world, while the arrows A−−→ express the agents’ epistemic uncertainty between
various worlds. As standard, we write s |=S ϕ for the satisfaction relation: ϕ is true
at world s in model S.
For every sentence ϕ, we can define a sentence aϕ by (universally) quantifying
over the accessible worlds: s |=S aϕ iff t |=S ϕ for all t such that s a−→t. Here, aϕ
may be interpreted as knowledge (in which case we use the notation Kaϕ instead) or
belief (in which case we use Baϕ instead), depending on the context. The existential
dual operator ♦aϕ := ¬a¬ϕ denotes a sense of “epistemic/doxastic possibility”.
A doxastic model (or KD45-model) is a -Kripke model satisfying the following
properties: seriality, i.e. for every s there exists some successor t such that s
a−→t ;
transitivity, i.e. if s
a−→t and t a−→w then s a−→w and euclideaness, i.e. if s a−→t and s a−→w
then t
a−→w. In a doxastic model, a is interpreted as belief, and denoted by Ba .
An epistemic model (or S5-model) is a Kripke model in which all the accessibility
relations are equivalence relations, i.e. reflexive, transitive and symmetric. In an epis-
temic model,a is interpreted as knowledgeKa . While S5 yields an elegant logic for
reasoning about distributed systems in AI, epistemologists have debated its proper-
ties in the context of modelling knowledge. Various alternative notions of knowledge
have been suggested and can be formalized in DEL [3]. An important weaker notion
of knowledge (S4) can be modeled via a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation
but gives up symmetry or Euclideaness (this notion is then truthful and positively
introspective but not necessarily negatively introspective).
DEL uses Kripke models (called event models) epistemic events, including the
agents’ knowledge/beliefs about the current event, in a similar manner to the way
Kripke models are traditionally used to represent the agents’ knowledge/beliefs about
the current state of the world. An event model (or “action model”)  = (E, A−−→, pre)
consists of a set E of “epistemic events” or actions, a precondition map pre associ-
ating a sentence pree to each event e, and binary accessibility relations
A−−→ for every
agent. The events e ∈ E are assumed to be purely epistemic actions (e.g. observation,
testimony, various other forms of communication or learning); pree is the precon-
dition of the action e, i.e. a sentence that is true in a possible world iff action e can
be performed in that world. The accessibility relations express the the current event’s
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“appearance” to each participant: the agents’ knowledge (or beliefs) about the current
action taking place.
A final key ingredient of DEL is the so-called Product Update mechanism,
which allows us to compute the effect of events on any initial epistemic/doxastic
state models. Given an input state model S = (S, A−−→, ‖.‖) and an event model
 = (E, A−−→, pre), we define their update product S ⊗  = (S ⊗ E, A−−→, ‖.‖)
to be a new (updated) model, containing the set of states S ⊗ E given by
{(s, e) ∈ S × E : s |=S pree) }, relations (s, e) A−→(s′, e′) iff s A−→s′ and e A−→e′ and
valuation ‖p‖S⊗ = {(s, e) ∈ S ⊗ E : s ∈ ‖p‖S}. So two output-states are epistem-
ically indistinguishable iff they are the result of indistinguishable actions performed
on indistinguishable input-states. This construction is based on two intuitive princi-
ples about rational knowledge change: 1) the “No Miracles” Principle, saying that
new knowledge can only be gained from epistemic (features of) actions; and 2) the
“Perfect Recall” Principle, saying that knowledge once gained is never lost. Finally,
the fact that the new valuation in the updated model is the same as in the input-model
reflects the “classical” idealizations assumed in standard DEL: in such a classical
setting (unlike a quantum setting), actions such as announcements, testimony and
learning can be assumed to be “purely epistemic”, i.e. to have no direct ontic effects.
Note that the update product works well when dealing with “hard information”
(absolutely certain and infallibly true knowledge), or even with (possibly false)
beliefs, as long as these beliefs are never contradicted by new incoming informa-
tion. However, if the incoming information goes against any prior beliefs, the update
product gives unintuitive results: in this case, the agent acquires inconsistent beliefs!
In order to avoid this undesirable outcome, several “softer”, more belief-revision-
friendly versions of DEL have been developed in recent years, by borrowing ideas
from Belief Revision Theory.
The standard theory of AGM belief revision adopts a number of postulates govern-
ing “rational” belief revision. In the AGM setting, the initial doxastic state is given
by a deductively closed set of sentences T , encoding the prior belief set (or theory)
of an agent. The action ∗ϕ of “revision with ϕ ” changes the prior theory T into a
revised set T ∗ ϕ. The AGM postulates impose conditions on the revision operator
∗, essentially incorporating the idea that revision is always successful (ϕ ∈ T ∗ ϕ)
and it changes the agent’s doxastic state in a minimal way (preserving “as much
as possible” of her prior beliefs). The DEL-style formalism provides a modal-logic
incarnation of the AGM framework, in terms of conditional reasoning or contingency
plans for belief revision [18]. In a possible world s, saying that an agent a believes ϕ
conditionally on ψ (written as Bϕψ) means that: agent a’s revision plan is such that,
if she were to learn ψ , then she would come to believe that ϕ was the case (in the
initial state, before the learning). In essence this expresses a conditional or hypotheti-
cal, “static” form of revision. In contrast, dynamic belief revision captures the revised
beliefs about what is true in the state after the learning action. The belief-revision
friendly setting of DEL [17, 18, 21, 22] can handle both types of changes (i.e. static
and dynamic revision), where dynamic revision is modeled via dynamic modalities
for specific epistemic events (corresponding to specific “model transformers”).
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4 The Logic of Informational Interactions
Our conclusion is that, both in the logical foundations of quantum mechanics and
in the logical approach to formal epistemology, the key notions and operators have
a fundamental dynamic nature. From this perspective we can compare the differ-
ent types of logical dynamics characterizing these different areas, and analyze their
points of agreement and difference.
In line with our extended analysis in [10], we observe that quantum test operators
ϕ? share some common features with public announcements ϕ! and AGM belief
revision ∗ϕ. All these operators represent informational actions, by which either a
classical or quantum information state gets updated with new information ϕ. First,
note that when a testable property is actualized by a successful quantum test ϕ?, the
observed property becomes true after the test: the observed system changes in such
a way that it come to satisfy the observed property ϕ (although it may have failed
to satisfy this property before the test). We see a similar behaviour in the revision
operator ∗ϕ: here, ϕ becomes accepted by the agent after a successful revision with ϕ
(although the agent may have not accepted ϕ before the revision). However, this is not
the case for truthful public announcements. We refer here for instance to the Moore
sentence p ∧ ¬Kp, which even if initially true becomes false after it is announced
to the (implicit) agent. Such Moore sentences are typical examples of sentences that
cannot be successfully learned: they are falsified by the very act of being learnt.
Second, observe that a quantum test can only be successful if the tested property
was “potentially true” before the test (i.e. the original state was not orthogonal to ϕ).
This is different from the case of successful (truthful) announcements, whose pre-
condition is that ϕ was actually true before the announcement (in the original state).
Third, another similarity between belief revision and quantum observations is that
quantum tests affect the original state in the minimal possible way that is compat-
ible with satisfying the observed property. Indeed, in quantum mechanics the state
of the observed system after a measurement ϕ? is the minimal modification of the
original state that has the tested property ϕ. Similarly, authors in the Belief Revi-
sion literature justify the AGM postulates and other, stronger conditions by assuming
a “conservatism” principle: the revision with ϕ should require only the minimal
doxastic change that is compatible with accepting the new information ϕ.
Fourth, like all other forms of information update, quantum tests have epistemic
effects. After a successful quantum test ϕ? is performed, new information becomes
accessible to the observer: we have not only [?ϕ]ϕ, but also [?ϕ]Kϕ. Fifth, quan-
tum tests are still very different from all other mentioned forms of information
update: besides their epistemic effects, they always have an ontic impact as well.
In a quantum world, there is no “purely epistemc” action, no free informational
lunches, no pure observations: all epistemic actions have ontic side-effects. Sixth,
these ontic side-effects of quantum tests have non-classical epistemic consequences,
leading to a non-monotonic dynamics of information. Another paradigmatic case of
non-monotonic information change is belief revision: as in quantum tests, prior infor-
mation can be overwritten by new incoming information. (But note that in the first
case the actual ontic state changes due to quantum tests while in the latter case only
the doxastic state is changed.) Finally, the ontic side-effects of quantum tests are
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non-local: observing a nearby (sub)system may change (sub)systems that are far
away! In the quantum world, learning is not a local affair: more precisely, although
all learning is local in its content (since only local properties can be learnt, due to the
relativistic limit to information flow), the act of learning such local features can have
global impact.
5 Conclusion
We have taken “quantum dynamic logic” to be the logic of physically-constrained
informational interactions. These informational interactions took the form of mea-
surements as well as entanglement between the subsystems of a given global physical
system. Similarly, (multi-agent) epistemic logic has been approached as the logic of
socially-constrained informational interactions (in the form of direct observations,
learning, various forms of communication and testimony, and more complex forms of
group knowledge-aggregation) between “subsystems” of a social system. Analyzing
both areas from the point of view of informational interactions has provided us with
a unifying perspective, allowing us to compare various forms of information update.
This view on the dynamic nature of informational interactions has opened up
several roads for further research in different directions: 1) it has provided a multi-
agent perspective to belief revision theory and given new tools to model relevant
phenomena in AI and social epistemology; 2) it has provided new formal tools that
can be used to give a dynamic account of knowledge in formal epistemology, one
direction that is currently being further explored defines knowledge as a fixed-point
of epistemic actions [3]; 3) the epistemic multi-agent perspective and the quan-
tum dynamic framework are logically compatible and can be united to provide an
integrated account to model both classical and quantum interactive scenarios.
There are limits to the power of these formalisms, but these limits provide chal-
lenges and opportunities for further logical investigation. In particular, most quantum
communication protocols known today are multi-agent applications that involve both
a quantum information flow and a classical knowledge transfer (by classical commu-
nication) between agents. However the formal tools used to model these applications
within quantum information theory, cannot fully account for such intricate classical-
quantum interactions. A more sophisticated combination of Dynamic Quantum Logic
and DEL is thus needed for the full specification and formal verification of agent-
based quantum protocols (such as Teleportation). In recent and on-going work [19],
we use a probabilistic extension of Quantum Dynamic Epistemic Logic, employ-
ing quantum event models, to capture this complex interplay between classical and
quantum informational flow.
Finally, we would like to stress that, while quantum tests do share some formal
features with purely epistemic/doxastic actions in Belief Revision theory and pub-
lic announcement operators, we are not trying to explain quantum behavior as a
purely epistemic or informational artifact (as some other authors have attempted,
e.g. [38]). In our view, quantum weirdness is not just a product of the observer’s
mind. On the contrary, we adopt a realist point of view: it is precisely the real-
world changes induced by quantum tests that are responsible for their epistemic
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peculiarities. Quantum learning is characterized by the erosion of the sharp classical
separation between “ontic” and “epistemic” : as we saw, in the quantum world there
can be no information change without changing the world [10]. Moreover, the real-
world effects of such information-gathering actions cannot be confined to a localized
region. As we saw, this is the “essence” of entanglement viewed from in an abstract
dynamic-logical form. Modern quantum computation theory takes this as an oppor-
tunity, rather than a problem or a weird case of spooky witchcraft: entanglement is
a resource which, if appropriately used, holds the promise of giving us new, almost
magical (though not unlimited) informational capabilities. And quantum dynamic
epistemic logic gives us both a better understanding of the nature of this resource
and a warning about its dangers. In the end, it shows that any attempts to learn more
about our immediate environment have unintended and far-reaching effects, going
far beyond our local circle. Entanglement and non-locality can thus be understood as
just more radical (and more realistic) physical embodiments of the above-mentioned
principle that “epistemic actions have ontic side-effects”. The whole universe is being
changed by our seemingly provincial squabble for information.
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